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Abstract 
There is a belief among some economists that 2008 financial crisis was caused by 
continuous low interest rates environment. They argue that low interest rate environment from 
the early to mid-2000s lead to the increase of banks’ risk-taking appetite.  Many empirical 
studies conducted in western countries have proven the negative relationship between interest 
rates and bank risk-taking. In this paper, we examine whether or not this connection exists 
within the Chinese economy. We measure bank risk-taking behaviour based on the ratio of non-
performing loans to total loans, and we find its relationship with two different kinds of interest 
rates: legal and market interest rates. In addition, we divided control variables into internal and 
external variables. We analyzed more than 800 observations made on Chinese banks between 
2003 and 2012. Consistent with similar studies conducted in western countries, we found that 
low level interest rates substantially increased bank risk-taking behaviour. 
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I. Introduction 
The outbreak of the global economic crisis in 2008 impacted the world’s financial system 
on a variety of levels. During this crisis, a large number of bank failures occurred all over the 
world, and since 2009, a very serious debt crisis has spread across Europe. Under the current 
international economic situation, academic, commercial, and political circles have renewed an 
emphasis on the risk-taking behaviours of banks. In order to maintain global economic stability, 
the Basel committee on Bank Supervision established the “Basel III”, a global regulatory 
standard on bank capital adequacy and risk, to urge banks’ managers to control risks taken by 
banks.  
Banks are special kinds of financial institutions whose primary operation is monetary-
based. A change in interest rates not only affects banks’ revenue but the banks’ cost of 
borrowing as well. Therefore, a change in interest rates also influences the banks’ risk-taking 
behaviour in their day-to-day business operations. Between 2000 and 2007, most western 
countries maintained relatively low nominal interest rates. Many empirical studies of western 
countries suggest that a low interest rate environment influences a bank’s risk preference and 
risk tolerance. Consequently, banks increase their risk-taking level by raising the proportion of 
risk assets or by other approaches. 
The Chinese financial market has gradually begun to open to foreign businesses, and the 
national macro-control tools are gradually maturing. Thus, the interest rates environment in 
China will begin to vary more frequently. Research on how the level of interest rates affects the 
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risk-taking behaviour of banks will, therefore, have a long-term, instructive significance on the 
development of China’s financial market. 
Although many scholars have researched the relationship between the level of interest 
rate and the behaviours of bank risk-taking, there are few references available in regard to 
China. In this paper, we will discuss the relationship of interest rates and bank risk-taking 
behaviour, as well as define and analyze other internal and external factors that impact bank 
risk-taking. According to the current situation in China, we designed different regression models 
by simulating the methodology employed by some western scholars. In total, we conduct five 
regressions with two different regression equations, using different measures of interest rates 
and different control variables. All of the regression simulations indicate that bank risk-taking 
behaviour is significantly and negatively correlated with the level of interest rate. This result is 
consistent with the conclusion of most mainstream research produced on this topic. In addition, 
we found other factors, such as the return on asset ratio, size, and total capital ratio of each 
bank, GDP growth rate, and monetary policy, also have a great impact on the bank risk-taking 
behaviours. 
The most important contribution of our research to existing literature is our creation of 
new regression models according to the real situation of China. Moreover, we used the ratio of 
non-performing loans to total loans to represent the level of risk-taking behaviour and 
observed the relationship between bank risk-taking and five different types of interest rates. 
The remainder of this paper is organized into four sections and appendices. The 
following section discusses the previous research conducted on subjects related to bank risk-
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taking and interest rates. Section III describes variables of banks’ risk-taking, interest rates, 
internal risks and external risks we will use in our regression analyses, and lists data sources of 
these variables, while section IV contains an explanation of our model and empirical results. In 
section V, we present our conclusions and discuss some further issues on how to improve our 
model. 
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II. Theoretical Background and Literature Review 
As we discussed above, bank risk-taking has greatly impacted the economic 
development and stability of its host country. As a result, economists and academics have 
produced a large number of studies on a variety of topics regarding banks’ risk-taking 
behaviours. 
On the topic of measuring a bank’s risk-taking, Delis and Kouretas (2011) explained that 
the ratio of bank’s risk assets to its total assets could be used for charting its risk-bearing level; 
risk assets are any and all assets excluding cash, government bonds, and inter-bank deposits. A 
study by Fernandez and Gonzalez (2005) agreed that the non-performing loan ratio could also 
be used to measure a bank’s risk-taking behaviour, since loan-related business is one of a 
bank’s key high-risk areas.  
The relationship between interest rates and bank risk-taking has also aroused concern 
among academics. Related studies show that interest rates affect a bank’s risk bearing level 
through three mechanisms: the profit-seeking mechanism (Rajan, 2005), the valuation 
mechanism (Borio & Zhu, 2008), and the insurance mechanism (Gambacorta, 2009). According 
to their analyses, the banks’ earnings derived from loan-related business will decline in a low 
interest rate environment. In order to seek higher profits, banks must be more willing to gain 
profits through high-risk business. In addition, banks tend to have better expectations for their 
assets valuation and cash flows in a low interest rate environment than they do when interest 
rates are high, which will then stimulate them to bear more risks. Moreover, low interest rates 
reflect a loose monetary policy, which indicates that the government is trying to create policies 
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that will stimulate economic development; a stable economic environment provides insurance 
on a bank’s risky investments. 
In addition to studying the interest rate environment, scholars have also researched 
other factors affecting bank risk-taking behaviour. These studies mainly focus on the following 
two aspects: 
1) Bank-level factors. The financial conditions of a bank greatly impact its risk-taking 
decisions. A bank’s balance sheets can also reflect its preferences on risky investments. Haldane 
(2009), Kishan and Opiela (2000) examined the relationship between the size of a bank and its 
risk-taking, concluding that bigger banks tend to increase risky investments because they are 
skilled in reducing risks through diversification. Denicolo et al. (2010) discovered that the 
liquidity of a bank can also influence its risk-taking: banks with high liquidity have a greater 
ability to take risks. Furthermore, Delis and Kouretas (2011) proved that banks with a higher 
leverage ratio are more willing to take risks. 
2) Macroeconomic factors. Studies conducted by Jimenez, Ongena, Peydro and Saurina 
(2008), Ioannidou et al. (2009), and Atnanasoglou, Brissimis and Delis (2009) examined whether 
or not monetary policy influences a bank’s risk-taking decisions; independently of one another, 
they found that an expanding monetary policy will lead banks to bear more risks. Moreover, 
Lopez et al. (2007) found that the economic growth rate will affect a bank’s risk-taking 
behaviour: in healthy economic times, with high GDP growth rates, banks are more optimistic 
and willing to take a greater number of risks.  
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The rest of this paper focuses on the relationship between the level of interest rates and 
banks’ risk-taking behaviour, specifically in China. It will also analyze the effects of 
macroeconomic situations and a bank’s specific financial conditions in relation to its risk-taking 
behaviours. 
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III. Sample and Variables 
3.1 Data Sources 
In order to conduct our study on the relationship between risk-taking behaviours and 
interest rates in banks, we created a large panel data set and used the regression function in 
Excel. We observed nearly all the listed banks in China, including commercial, cooperate, and 
savings banks, between 2003 and 2012. Interest rate data and other macroeconomic data was 
collected from the websites of the People’s Bank of China and the National Database of China 
(National Bureau Statistics of China); annual data for banks was taken from the Bankscope 
database. Our Sample includes a total of 808 observations. In order to minimize the impact of 
extreme observations on the estimation outcomes, we manually deleted around 20 outliers 
using the sorting function in Excel. 
3.2 Bank Risk-Taking 
We used the ratio of non-performing loans to total loans (denoted as NPLR) to stand for 
bank risk-taking behaviours. This ratio was obtained from Bankscope and is presented in Table 
1, Summary statistics (Appendix A). The reason we used the non-performing loans ratio is that 
it reflects the quality of bank assets: high non-performing loans ratios usually indicate that 
banks are more willing to provide loans to pursue high returns even though these loans have 
low ratings and high risks, while low non-performing loans ratios indicate that banks are more 
concerned with qualities of their loans and tend to bear less risks. In addition, this ratio can also 
represent a bank’s credit risks, which means the higher the non-performing loans ratio, the 
higher the bank’s credit risk. The average value of the non-performing loans ratio in our sample 
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equals 2.706; the highest average value was reported in 2003, at 9.27%, and relatively low 
values in 2008, 2011, and 2012, which all equalled around 1%. 
3.3 Interest Rate 
Most previous studies on the topic that we selected have focused on the relationship 
between the general level of interest rates and the behaviour of bank risk-taking. In this paper, 
however, we divide the various interest rates into legal benchmark interest rates and market 
interest rates. Legal benchmark interest rates include short-term borrowing (STBoR), long-term 
borrowing (LTBoR), short-term lending (STLeR) and long-term lending interest rates (LTLeR). In 
particular, we used the one-year legal benchmark borrowing interest rates as STBoR, five-year 
legal benchmark borrowing interest rates as LTBoR, six months to one year legal benchmark 
lending interest rates as STLeR, and more than five-year legal benchmark lending interest rates 
as LTLeR. This data was all collected from the People’s Bank of China website.  
For market interest rates, we used bank level interest rates from each bank, which 
equals the total interest income divided by total loans. According to our observation period, 
2003 to 2012, the average value of these rates was lowest in 2003 and remained low until 2006; 
the highest interest rates occurred in 2007 and 2008, and fluctuated thereafter. We have 
reported the correlation coefficients between each variable in Table 2 below (Appendix C). We 
found that the ratios of non-performing loans are negative in relation to all recorded interest 
rates between 2003 and 2012. The negative correlation coefficients and Figure 1 below 
(Appendix B), which presents a simple, non-parametric regression between non-performing 
 9 
loan ratios and bank level lending rates, both provide us with evidence that a low interest rate 
environment is related to higher risk-taking behaviours of banks. 
3.4 Control Variables 
In our regression equations, we set the non-performing loan ratio as dependent 
variables and various interest rates as independent variables. Since there are many other 
elements that may be associated with bank risk-taking, we also controlled some other factors in 
order to observe the “real” relationship between NPLR and various interest rates. We divided 
the control variables into internal and external variables. Internal variables (namely bank-level 
variables) include return on average assets (denoted as ROAA), size (measured as the natural 
logarithm of total assets), and total capital ratio (denoted as ToCapR); external variables (like 
some macroeconomic variables) include GDP growth rate (denoted as GDPG) and money supply 
growth rate (denoted as M2G). We used different combinations of control variables in each 
regression equation according to our analyses and tests. The summary statistics of the control 
variables are presented in Table 1 (Appendix A). 
3.5 General Empirical Model 
The general empirical regression equation we estimated is as follows: 
   
In the equation above, subscript “i” represents a certain bank and subscript “t” stands 
for a certain year. Therefore, dependent variables and internal control variables are a panel 
data set, while other variables are time series data sets. Risk represents the level of bank risk-
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taking, which is itself measured by non-performing loan ratios (NPLR). IR represents various 
interest rates, including four kinds of legal benchmark interest rates and one type of market 
level interest rates. IV stands for internal variables and EV is the notation for external variables.  
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IV. Empirical Model and Results Analysis  
In order to find the relationship between interest rates and a bank’s risk-taking 
behaviour in China, we designed two empirical regression equations according to our analysis 
about the current situation in China and many test-models. 
   (1) 
We used the simple equation (1) to regress a bank’s non-performing loan ratio on 
China’s four legal benchmark lending rates (  seperately. These rates include short-term 
borrowing, short-term lending, long-term borrowing, and long-term lending rates, respectively. 
Here denotes a bank’s internal variables: ROAAs, total capital ratios and sizes;  denotes 
China’s macroeconomic variables: GDP growth rates and money supply growth rates. 
The regression results from equation (1) are presented in Table 3 (Appendix D). In this 
table, column I and column III are the regression results when using short-term and long-term 
borrowing rates as the interest rate variable. Negative coefficients -2.8213 and -2.5808 indicate 
that increasing short-term or long-term borrowing rates will decrease a bank’s risky 
investments. The reason for this negative relationship may be that in a low interest rate 
environment, a decreased interest rate might result in a decline in banks’ costs on interest 
payments, which will force banks to allocate more funds to risky investments. Column II and 
column IV present the results when short-term and long-term lending rates are the 
determinants of bank risk. These two lending rates have similar coefficients to the borrowing 
rates, which are also negative and significant (-3.0591 and -3.3904, respectively). The reason for 
this negative correlation may be that when the level of legal benchmark lending rates is low, a 
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bank’s income from interests on loans will decline. Therefore, banks are required and 
incentivized to increase risky investments in order to pursue higher profits and achieve their 
profit targets. According to these results, bank risk-taking behaviours have negative 
relationships with interest rates, irrespective of the type of interest rates variables. 
Regardless of the interest rate variables, the effects of other control variables to bank 
risk-taking are similar no matter which type of interest rates is used. In terms of bank-level 
internal variables, ROAA has a negative and significant relationship with a bank’s risk-taking 
behaviour (-1.9130, -2.09203, -1.680 and -2.0158, respectively), which means that a bank’s 
profitability is negatively correlated with bank risk-taking. This outcome opposes our original 
hypothesis according to the rule of ‘higher risk, higher profit.’ However, we did not use only 
one variable in our regression model. Therefore, the final negative relationship between RROA 
and bank risk-taking is the result of the interaction of various factors in our regression equation. 
Moreover, coefficients on total capital ratio and size are both negative, although not always 
significantly, indicating that large banks or those with higher total capital ratios tend to have 
less risky investments and are exposed to less credit risk.  
When it comes to macroeconomic variables, our regression results indicate that banks 
are more likely to increase their risky investments in an economic environment with a high GDP 
growth rate. In this type of economic environment, banks tend to have good anticipations on 
economic development. Therefore, their expectation on investment returns during healthy 
economic times will be higher than during an economic depression. However, the relationship 
between M2G and bank risk-taking is negative. We argue that a rapid growth rate of money 
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supply will lead to persistent inflation pressure. The sustained inflation pressure will have a 
negative impact on the development of every walk of life. 
   (2) 
After analysing the relationship between a bank’s risk-taking behaviour and the four 
legal benchmark interest rates, we use equation (2) to do the regression between banks’ non-
performing loans rates and their bank-level lending rates. Since bank loans and interest-based 
income are already affected by macroeconomic factors (e.g. GDP growth rate and money 
supply amount), we eliminate all these external variable in equation (1) and only regress banks’ 
risk-taking variables on interest rates and a bank’s personal financial condition index. 
The regression results are presented in Table 3 (Appendix D). As we can see from the 
table, the regression outcomes from equation (2) using market level interest rates have similar 
indications over a bank’s risk-taking behaviour, as shown in the results from equation (1), when 
using legal benchmark interest rates. In particular, bank-level lending rates have a significantly 
negative correlation (-17.60879) with bank risk-taking; the coefficients of bank size (-0.29214), 
total capital ratio (-0.15530), and ROAA (-2.50771) are also negative.  
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V. Conclusion and Further Discussion 
In summary, we analysed factors that affect bank risk-taking behaviour, focusing on the 
relationship between the level of interest rates and bank risk-taking. We divided the control 
variables into internal (bank-level) and external (country-level) variables; the internal variables 
include ROAA, size, and total capital ratio, while external variables consist of GDPG and M2G. 
Moreover, we divided various interest rates into legal benchmark and market level interest 
rates.  
In our empirical analysis, we finally chose two regression equations, according to our 
study and quantity of regression tests. The two regression equations include a model with four 
separate legal benchmark interest rates and a model with market level interest rates. In each 
estimated model we used non-performing loans ratio to represent the level of bank risk-taking. 
According to the regression results from our two empirical models, a low interest rate 
environment significantly increased bank risk-taking behaviour. In terms of other control 
variables, the results of both models using different types of interest rates were also similar. 
ROAA and M2G were significantly negative correlated with bank risk-taking, and GDPG showed 
significant, positive relationships with bank risk-taking; the coefficients of both bank size and 
total capital ratio were negative but not always significant in our multivariable regression 
models. 
The measurement of bank risk-taking behaviour is a very complex task. Due to time 
constraints and our limited expertise, there are still many deficiencies with our study. First, 
there are many kinds of risks associated with banking operations, such as credit, legal, and 
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operation risks. We used a non-performing loan ratio to represent bank risk-taking, but this 
ratio cannot comprehensively represent every risk. Therefore, we need to find a more suitable 
dependent variable for future study. Second, the risk to banks is persistent, partially because a 
bank’s risk-taking behaviour may be associated with the economic cycle and time lag may exist 
for banks to react to macroeconomic change. Therefore, the results of a static model, like the 
one we used, may be biased to a certain extent. To reflect the interminable characteristics of 
bank risk-taking, we should design a dynamic model that includes some risk variables that 
address the time lag issue.  
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Appendices: Tables and Figures  
Appendix A 
Table 1: Summary Statistics 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Bank Risk Taken NPLR 2.706 3.620 0.200 38.220 
Internal Variables 
ROAA 0.911 0.463 -0.770 3.000 
ToCapR 12.594 6.518 -0.390 56.590 
Size 5.125 0.996 1.230 8.270 
External Variables 
GDPG 10.521 1.970 7.650 14.160 
M2G 17.258 4.115 13.600 27.700 
Various Interest rates 
BLLeR 6.036 0.015 2.232 14.286 
LTLeR 6.631 0.479 5.760 7.490 
STLeR 6.062 0.480 5.310 6.930 
LTBoR 4.460 0.677 2.790 5.280 
STBoR 2.796 0.468 1.980 3.465 
 
This table presents summary statistics for all variables used in our empirical analysis. Our 
sample includes 808 observations made on listed banks in China. The table reports the mean, 
standard deviation, minimum value, and maximum value for each factor. The variables are as 
follows: NPLR is the notation for non-performing loans ratio, which equals non-performing 
loans to total loans, ROAA is return on average assets, ToCapR is total capital ratio, size is the 
natural logarithm of total assets, GDPG is GDP growth rate, M2G is broad money growth rate, 
BLLeR is bank level lending rate, which is the ratio of total interest income to total loans, LTLeR 
is the more than five years lending rates, STLeR is the six months to one year lending rates, 
LTBoR is the five-year borrowing rates, and STBoR is the one-year borrowing rates. 
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Appendix B 
Figure 1: Non-Parametric Regression between NPLR and Bank-Level Lending Rates 
 
 
Fig. 1. Bank-level lending rates and non-performing loan ratios. The figure presents the non-
parametric regression between bank risk-taking, measured by the ratio of non-performing loans 
to total loans, and the bank-level lending rates, measured by the ratio of interest income to 
total loans. The regression line reflects the negative relationship between non-performing loan 
ratios and the bank-level lending rates.  
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Appendix C 
Table 2: Correlation Matrix 
  NPLR  ROAA ToCapR Size GDPG M2G BLLeR LTLeR STLeR LTBoR STBoR 
NPLR 1.000  
          
ROAA -0.389 1.000  
         
ToCapR -0.296 0.099  1.000  
        
Size -0.041 0.112  -0.203 1.000  
       
GDPG 0.204  -0.202 -0.243 -0.242 1.000  
      
M2G 0.054  -0.064 0.001  0.035  -0.139 1.000  
     
BLLeR -0.196 0.428  0.019  -0.252 0.016  -0.321 1.000  
    
LTLeR -0.174 0.132  0.039  -0.169 0.537  -0.664 0.467  1.000  
   
STLeR -0.172 0.146  0.054  -0.146 0.478  -0.716 0.475  0.990  1.000  
  
LTBoR -0.377 0.302  0.201  -0.032 0.119  -0.682 0.468  0.825  0.855  1.000  
 
STBoR -0.341 0.305  0.213  -0.034 0.113  -0.655 0.495  0.854  0.890  0.949  1.000  
 
This table presents correlation coefficients for the variables used in our research. The variables 
are as follows: NPLR is the notation for non-performing loans ratio, which equals non-
performing loans to total loans, ROAA is return on average assets, ToCapR is total capital ratio, 
size is the natural logarithm of total assets, GDPG is GDP growth rate, M2G is broad money 
growth rate, BLLeR is bank level lending rate, which is the ratio of total interest income to total 
loans, LTLeR is the more than five years lending rates, STLeR is the six months to one year 
lending rates, LTBoR is the five-year borrowing rates, and STBoR is the one-year borrowing 
rates. 
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Appendix D 
Table 3: Multivariable Regression Results  
I II III IV V
ROAA -1.91304 -2.09204 -1.68002 -2.01586 -2.50771
Size -0.088357 -0.1448 -0.06867 -0.16231 -0.29214
GDPG 0.22719 0.47280 0.25812 0.56304
M2G -0.16049 -0.19051 -0.23635 -0.19021
-17.60879BLLeR
-0.15530
LTBoR -2.58080
LTLeR -3.39049
ToCapR -0.09402 -0.10746 -0.08184 -0.10441
SRLeR -3.05917
STBoR -2.82138
 
The table shows the regression coefficients. In regression I-V dependent variable is the ratio of 
non-performing loans to total loans. We use short term borrowing rate(STBoR), long term 
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borrowing rate(LTBoR), short term lending rate(STLeR), long term lending rate(LTLeR) and bank-
level lending rate(BLLeR) in regression I-V respectively. The explanatory variables are as follows: 
ROAA is return on average assets, ToCapR is total capital ratio, size is the natural logarithm of 
total assets, GDPG is GDP growth rate, M2G is broad money growth rate, BLLeR is bank level 
lending rate, which is the ratio of total interest income to total loans, LTLeR is the more than 
five years lending rates, STLeR is the six months to one year lending rates, LTBoR is the five-year 
borrowing rates, and STBoR is the one-year borrowing rates. 
 21 
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